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  1 
The “moral basis” of reconstruction? Humanitarianism, Intellectual Relief and 
the League of Nations, 1918-1925.1 
 
Article 247 of the Treaty of Versailles committed Germany to furnish “the University 
of Louvain [with] manuscripts, incunabula, printed books, maps and objects of 
collection corresponding in number and value to those destroyed in the burning by 
Germany of the Library of Louvain.”2 The obligation that Germany restore books to a 
Belgian university library – destroyed during the invasion of August 1914 – was a 
public acknowledgement that Belgian, and by extension allied, intellectual life, would 
continue as before the war; it presupposed the values of western civilization had 
triumphed in the recently-ended conflict. 
 The restitution of books to Louvain was highly symbolic, but far from an 
isolated act of cultural reconstruction in the aftermath of the Great War. In the 
immediate post-war years, myriad projects emerged to save both intellectuals and 
scholarly activity in central and Eastern Europe. European intellectual life faced a 
significant and often existential challenge following the conflict; the collapse of 
empires led to, at its most extreme, civil war, famine, and displacement, as it did in 
Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution. In the successor states of central and 
eastern Europe, the destruction wrought by the recently-ended world war was 
exacerbated by economic collapse which brought famine and disease to many countries 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Daniel Laqua, Elisabeth Piller, Katharina Rietzler, Ciarán Wallace and the 
anonymous reviewers for Modern Intellectual History for their comments on previous drafts of this 
article. 
2 Article 247, The Treaty of Versailles, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/versailles_menu.asp. 
John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities 1914: a History of Denial (New Haven, 2001), 387.  
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in the early 1920s. Transnational agencies quickly mounted humanitarian interventions 
to feed, clothe, and provide medical assistance to those affected.3  
While the story of humanitarian responses to the post-war crises has been well 
documented by historians in recent years, it is less well known that post-war relief also 
had a distinct and important intellectual dimension. Non-governmental agencies sent 
books, laboratory equipment, and periodicals to stricken countries in order to ensure 
that their intellectual life stayed afloat, while international agencies also sent money 
and supplies to scholars and writers who found themselves in exile in the early 1920s. 
Intellectual relief of this nature emerged during the war and reflected its perception as 
a cultural conflict involving the mass mobilization of scholars to support their 
respective nations’ cause which led to the common juxtaposition of allied western 
civilization against German Kultur. 4  After the war, the scope of intellectual relief 
expanded to address the vast humanitarian crisis gripping Europe. While its agents 
frequently utilised the language of civilization (and its opposite, barbarism), post-war 
intellectual relief belonged to the broader humanitarian drive to arrest the spread of 
                                                 
3 Bruno Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism 1918-1924 (Cambridge, 2014); 
189-247; Bertrand Patenaude, The Big Show in Bololand: the American Relief Expedition to Soviet 
Russia in the Famine of 1921 (Stanford, CA., 2002); Chiara Tessaris, “The War relief work of the 
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in Poland and Lithuania, 1915-18”, East European 
Jewish Affairs, 40/2 (2010), 127-144; Christopher Blackburn: “The Rebirth of Poland: American 
Humanitarianism after the Great War”, Studia Historyczne, 4/228 (2014), 522-539; Julia F. Irwin, 
“Taming Total War: Great War-Era American Humanitarianism and its Legacies”, Diplomatic History, 
38/4 (2014), 763-775; Tammy M. Proctor, “An American Enterprise: British Participation in US Food 
Relief Programmes (1914-1923)”, First World War Studies, 5/1 (2014), 29-42; Georgina Brewis, A 
Social History of Student Volunteering: Britain and Beyond, 1880-1980 (New York, 2014), 52; Emily 
Baughan, “The Imperial War Relief Fund and the All British Appeal: Commonwealth, Conflict and 
Conservatism within the British Humanitarian Movement, 1920-25”, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 40/5 (2012), 845-61. 
4 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “German artists, writers, and intellectuals, and the meaning of war 1914-
1918” in John Horne, ed., State Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War 
(Cambridge, 1997), 21-38; Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German 
Academic Community, 1890-1933 (Cambridge, MA.,1969), 180-190; Alan Kramer, Dynamic of 
Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War (Oxford, 2007), 159-164; John Horne 
and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities 1914, 280-2; Martha Hanna, The Mobilization of Intellect: 
French Scholars and Writers during the Great War (Cambridge, MA,1996), 78-85; Jörg Nagler, “From 
Culture to Kultur. Changing American Perceptions of Imperial Germany, 1870-1914,” in David E. 
Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt eds., Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and 
America Since 1776 (Cambridge, 1997). 
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Bolshevism and support the post-war, democratic order in central and eastern Europe. 
Intellectual relief was also a forum for national rivalries; on the one hand, nations like 
Hungary could claim the imperative of intellectual relief to demonstrate their travails 
following the war and its peace settlement and thus agitate for treaty revision. On the 
other hand, national antipathies – such as those between victorious allies and 
vanquished states – often inhibited the granting of relief.  
This article will explore the origins and forms of intellectual relief in the 
immediate post-war period before paying particular attention to the intellectual work of 
the League of Nations and its Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (CIC, founded in 
1922). The League is important to this discussion as it gave permanent institutional 
structures for intellectual cooperation which were born in the period of Europe’s 
humanitarian and intellectual crises. While the League did not have the resources to 
sponsor large-scale humanitarian interventions in the scholarly field, relief was a central 
concern that informed how the League developed its intellectual cooperation agenda, 
both in terms of activities and structures, from 1922. 
This article also points the way forward to a phenomenon that became much 
more prominent in the later twentieth century, and which remains important today, that 
of intellectual exile and suffering during and after major conflicts. 5  Post-war 
intellectual relief forms an important and instructive precedent to international attempts 
to rescue intellectuals fleeing from totalitarianism in the 1930s.6 It also provides an 
                                                 
5 Jean-Michel Palmier, Weimar in Exile: the Antifascist Emigration in Europe and America (London: 
Verso, 2006); Sally Crawford, Katharina Ulmschneider and Jaś Elsner eds., Ark of Civilization: 
Refugee Scholars and Oxford University, 1930-1945 (Oxford, 2017); Stuart Jeffries, Grand Hotel 
Abyss: the Lives of the Frankfurt School (London, 2016); Lewis Coser, Refugee Scholars in America: 
Their Impact and their Experience (New Haven, 1984); Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn eds., The 
Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960 (Cambridge, MA., 1969). 
6 Stephen Duggan and Betty Drury, The Rescue of Science and Learning: the Story of the Emergency 
Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars (New York, 1948), 3-4. 
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important precedent for the reconstruction of intellectual life that took place in Europe 
following the Second World War.7 
The article will first examine the emergence of intellectual relief. It will then 
discuss the foundation and workings of the CIC, before turning its attention to two 
related themes in the operation of the CIC: intellectual relief in different territories and 
enquiries into the health of intellectual life in various countries. It will demonstrate that 
intellectual life was seen as requiring specific aid in the aftermath of war, explore how 
arguments for intellectual relief were constructed, and analyse how relief was 
organised. While it claimed to stand for a universal good in the face of Bolshevism, 
intellectual relief also perpetuated the divisions of wartime, notably with respect to 
Germany. 
 The First World War left nine million combatants dead, killed a similar number 
of civilians in Europe, and brought about the collapse of four empires. It also 
profoundly influenced European intellectual life in three main ways. First, the conflict 
led to a “lost generation” of young scholars who died in the conflict, evidenced by the 
numerous memorials which emerged at schools and universities across Europe after the 
war.8 Second, organised intellect – often seen as serving the interests of all humanity 
and thus being above national interests – was mobilized to serve the interests of nations 
at war, whether it be historians or philosophers producing propaganda, sociologists 
organising the war economy, or, more ominously, chemists producing poison gases for 
the battlefield. Third, a consequence of all of this was that the international community 
of intellect, which had grown in size in the decades prior to 1914, was split in two 
                                                 
7 John Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe (Cambridge, 
MA, 2006).  
8 Tomás Irish, “Fractured Families: Educated Elites in Britain and France and the Challenge of the 
Great War”, Historical Journal 57/2 (2014), 509-30; Jay Winter, The Great War and the British people 
(London, 1985) 92-9; Jean-François Sirinelli, Génération intellectuelle: khâgneux et normaliens dans 
l’entre-deux-guerres (Paris, 1988), 26-30. 
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during the war, with former colleagues recast as enemies. 9  This fracture in the 
organization of intellectual life continued into the post-war years and could be seen in 
the ‘boycott’ of German scientists who were prevented from joining newly formed 
scholarly associations which emerged after the war.10  
 In a famous and resonant polemic in 1919, the French poet Paul Valéry wrote 
that “we civilizations now know that we are mortal”, much like civilizations of antiquity 
which had disappeared long ago and taken their vast resources of learning with them. 
For evidence of the decline of civilization, Valéry cited the example of wartime 
application of science to conflict which led him to question whether “knowledge and 
duty” were themselves suspect. 11 In the same year, the French pacifist intellectual 
Romain Rolland produced a manifesto signed by 140 scholars and writers across the 
world which criticised the engagement of intellectuals in wartime and called on them 
to renounce wartime attitudes.12 Narratives presaging the decline of civilization became 
common among scholars in the war’s aftermath and famously featured in the work of 
Oswald Spengler, among others. 13  The “crisis of civilization” was an intellectual 
reaction to the events of the Great War and wider developments in scholarship, 
literature, and the arts, many of which predated the conflict but seemed to be confirmed 
by it.14 In that respect the crisis was largely an imagined, intangible phenomenon. 
                                                 
9 For more on the many ways in which academic life was transformed by the First World War, see 
Tomás Irish, The University at War 1914-25: Britain, France and the United States (Basingstoke, 
2015), and the essays in Tomás Irish and Marie-Eve Chagnon eds., The Academic World in the Era of 
the Great War (London, 2018). 
10 Daniel Kevles, ‘“Into Hostile Political Camps’: The Reorganization of International Science in 
World War I”, Isis 62/1 (1971), 47-60; A.G. Cock, “Chauvinism and Internationalism in Science: The 
International Research Council. 1919-1926”, Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 37/2 
(1983), 249-88. 
11 Paul Valéry, “The Spiritual Crisis”, The Athenaeum, 11 April 1919, 182. 
12 Romain Rolland, Quinze ans de combat (1919-1934) (Paris, 1935), 7-9. 
13 Jan Ifversen, “The Crisis of European Civilisation after 1918”, in Menno Spiering and Michael 
Wintle eds., Ideas of Europe since 1914: the Legacy of the First World War (Basingstoke, 2002), 14-
31, at 14. 
14 Arnold J. Toynbee, The World after the Peace Conference (London, 1926), 87-89. 
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However, the post-war threats to intellectual life in central and Eastern Europe proved 
a tangible, real-world crisis which gave substance to the imagined one. 
 
Intellectual Relief in post-war Europe 
 
The plight of displaced and starving intellectuals first emerged as a problem during the 
First World War and came to be seen as a distinct part of the wider humanitarian crisis 
that gripped Europe during and after the conflict. Intellectual relief can be defined in 
two related ways. First, and most pressing, it was an extension of general humanitarian 
relief, ensuring that intellectuals and intellectual workers were able to eat, clothe 
themselves, and generally maintain good health. In other words, this can be understood 
as the provision of general relief to people engaged in intellectual pursuits. Second, 
intellectual relief can also be understood as the provision of specialist equipment, up-
to-date books and periodicals to people involved in intellectual pursuits. This article is 
primarily concerned with the latter as it was the concern of the League of Nations’ work 
on behalf of intellectuals. However, that can only be understood through a wider 
discussion of intellectual relief and humanitarianism after 1918. 
The First World War saw a number of large-scale humanitarian interventions, 
spanning the early years of the conflict and continuing into the mid-1920s. Branden 
Little has argued that the core dates for humanitarian interventions in this period are 
1914-1924, which extends beyond the “paradigmatic” end date of the war in 1918.15 
Recent scholarship focusing on the “wars after the war” – the continuation of violence 
in central and eastern Europe after 1918 – has also challenged the traditional timeframes 
                                                 
15 Branden Little, “An Explosion of New Endeavours: Global Humanitarian Responses to 
Industrialised Warfare in the First World War Era”, First World War Studies, 5/1 (2014), 1. 
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of the war, and has argued that a “greater war”, continued until 1923. 16  These 
humanitarian responses can be seen as one of the many consequences of the war that 
continued beyond the conflict’s formal cessation and extend its chronology. 
The First World War did much to change the way in which humanitarianism 
was practiced and understood. Keith David Watenpaugh has argued that “modern 
humanitarianism” was born in the period of the Great War. This was understood as the 
“permanent, transnational, institutional, neutral, and secular regime for understanding 
and addressing the root causes of human suffering”, unlike its sentimental, episodic and 
Christian nineteenth century predecessor. 17  Bruno Cabanes has argued that the 
humanitarian responses to the war inaugurated the international recognition of many 
rights for the first time, such as the right to aid for victims of famine and disease and 
the right to identity papers and safe travel for stateless people.18 During and after the 
war, humanitarian responses were organised either through the formation of new 
charitable organisations, such as the American Relief Administration (ARA) or the 
Imperial War Relief Fund (IWRF), or through the commitment of existing foundations 
to help address the humanitarian crises. Many of these organisations operated with the 
assistance and support of their respective states of origin and also required the 
cooperation of the states in which they operated. For example, the ARA was founded 
in February 1919 following an Executive Order by Woodrow Wilson with a $100 
million appropriation from the United States Congress, and was responsible for the 
supply of 768,000 tons of food, clothing, and other supplies to Russia between 1921 
                                                 
16 John Horne and Robert Gerwarth, War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the 
Great War (Oxford, 2013), Robert Gerwarth, The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to 
End, 1917-1923 (London, 2016). 
17 Keith David Watenpaugh, Bread from Stones: the Middle East and the Making of Modern 
Humanitarianism (Oakland, 2015), 4-5; Watenpaugh, “The League of Nations’ Rescue of Armenian 
Genocide Survivors and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920-1927”, American Historical 
Review, 115/5 (2010), 1319. 
18 Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 300-301. 
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and 1923 when famine threatened 25 million people.19  As Julia F. Irwin has noted, 
humanitarianism was far from neutral or purely altruistic; it was often used as a tool of 
statecraft and for propaganda purposes.20  
While, in a general sense, the primary aim of humanitarianism was always to 
feed, clothe, and provide medical aid to those in need, the outbreak of the war in 1914 
and its earliest humanitarian responses bore a distinct intellectual component. 
Professors and students from Belgian universities were quickly housed at institutions 
across Britain, France and North America and funds were raised for their upkeep.21 The 
American Joint Relief Committee, established in November 1914 specifically to aid 
European Jews imperilled by the war, also provided funds for the upkeep of educational 
institutions during the war, before expanding its scope after the war to include “rabbis, 
writers, teachers and spiritual leaders.”22 While elements of intellectual relief can be 
seen during the conflict, its scale and scope expanded dramatically following the war.  
With famine afflicting large parts of central and Eastern Europe, the ARA set 
up what it called “intelligentsia kitchens” in Austria and Poland in 1921, which were 
solely for the use of those deemed “intellectuals.”23 In Austria, these kitchens served 
the needs of Austrian university professors and writers, as it was felt that following the 
steep rise in the cost of living there, “the section which will be hardest hit is the middle 
class and especially the intellectual group, since their incomes and earnings are far from 
keeping pace with the progress of depreciation and consequent increase in price of all 
commodities.”24 In Poland, intelligentsia kitchens catered to the large body of Russian 
                                                 
19 Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 189-239. 
20 Irwin, “Taming Total War”, 763, 767. 
21 Grace Osler to George Dock, 17 November 1914, Osler Library, Montreal, Grace Revere Osler 
papers 326/1.5; Edwin B. Frost, letter to Science, New Series, 40/1032 (1914), 522; Book of Belgium’s 
Gratitude (London, 1916). 
22 Joseph C. Hyman, Twenty Five Years of American Aid to Jews Overseas (New York, 1939), 21-22. 
23 “Extension of Assistance to the Intellectual Classes”, A.R.A. Bulletin, 2/12 (1921), 28-31. 
24 “Notes on Relief”, A.R.A. Bulletin, 21/2 (1922), 36.  
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intellectuals who had fled Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution.25 In Russia 
itself, specific funds were dedicated to the relief of intellectuals, which primarily meant 
the provision of food: $50,000 per month from the Commonwealth Fund of New York 
from March 1922, $230,000 from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund in 
December 1922, and a further $600,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation in February 
1923.26 This work was supported by other agencies such as the Commonwealth Fund 
and the Russian Red Cross.  
In most, but not all cases, relief of intellectuals and professors was seen as 
distinct from student relief, which was often organised separately. For example, the 
Society of Friends opened kitchens for students in Germany before their work was 
taken over by the European Student Relief (ESR) arm of the World Student Christian 
Federation in 1921. Between 1920 and 1925 the ESR raised £500,000 from 42 countries 
which was, in turn, spent on projects in 21 countries.27 By 1923 the ESR estimated that 
it had fed 25,000 students.28 The ARA, working in conjunction with the YMCA and 
the World Student Christian Federation, also had its own schemes that focused 
specifically on feeding students which, by the start of April 1921, reached 23,360 
students in seven countries.29 The London-based Imperial War Relief Fund established 
a Universities’ Committee in 1920 to deal with intellectual relief, which aimed to send 
one British pound in cash or gifts-in-kind (but not books or periodicals) to those in need 
for each of the 60,000 students in Great Britain and Ireland. In its first year it raised 
£32,465 in cash and goods.30 The Universities’ Committee was keen to distinguish 
                                                 
25 “American Service to the Intellectual Classes”, A.R.A. Bulletin, 2/9 (1921), 32 
26 Patenaude, Big Show in Bololand, 179. 
27 Brewis, A Social History of Student Volunteering, 54. 
28 European Student Relief report, League of Nations Archives, United Nations Library, Geneva (LNA) 
13C, dossier 23815, document 24805x (R1049). 
29 “Student Feeding in European Universities”, A.R.A. Bulletin, 2/13 (1921), 31-35. 
30 “Universities Committee: the Work of the Past Year and the Future Outlook”, October 1921, LNA, 
13C doss. 14297, doc. 25341x. For more on the work of the Universities’ Committee and student relief 
more generally, see Brewis, A Social History of Student Volunteering, 51-63. 
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between aid directed towards students, on the one hand, and university professors on 
the other; in November 1921 it noted that the appeal on behalf of students had been 
much more successful but that “men distinguished in letters and science” also needed 
urgent aid.31 
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) also considered the 
issue of intellectual relief in the immediate post-war years. In 1922, the director of the  
Endowment’s Division of Intercourse and Education, Nicholas Murray Butler, stated 
that “the plight of the intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe that has so often been 
brought to our attention grows worse instead of better and yet we are helpless to aid 
and no other agency is able or disposed to do anything whatsoever.” 32  A special 
appropriation of $500,000 was set aside by the Endowment’s Division of Intercourse 
and Education at the end of the war for the reconstruction of the devastated regions of 
Belgium, France, Serbia and Russia. This money was mostly spent on exemplary and 
symbolic relief projects such as the rebuilding of the university library at Louvain in 
Belgium and the construction of new libraries in Rheims and Belgrade. 33  The 
Rockefeller Foundation was also active in intellectual relief but limited itself to the 
medical sciences; it provided both literature and scientific equipment to “countries with 
low exchange and difficult economic conditions” such as Austria, France, Hungary, 
Germany, and much of continental Europe.34  
                                                 
31 Letter to the Graduate Members of Great Britain and Ireland’, Beveridge Papers, London School of 
Economics archives, LSE/Beveridge/7/90/156. 
32 Butler to Henry Pritchett, 4 April 1922, Columbia University Rare Books and Manuscripts Library, 
Columbia University, New York, Carnegie Corporation, III.A.Grant Files.72, Folder 9.  
33 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book 1921 (Washington D.C.: 1921), 35-42. 
34 The full list of countries in receipt of scientific literature was: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Switzerland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. The Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report, 1924 (New York, 
1924), 325. 
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The Russian Revolution and ensuing civil war also created a significant problem 
of displaced people. 35  The Bolshevik government viewed intellectuals with great 
suspicion, as the majority of Russian intellectuals were opposed to the October 
Revolution, a situation that became more pronounced following the Kronstadt uprising 
of 1921. Deportations took place in 1922 and led to the arrival of many émigré scholars 
in Western Europe.36 The Swiss writer Gonzague de Reynold, who was known for his 
Catholic and Swiss-nationalist views, as well as being a member of the League’s 
Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, called the emigration of Russian scholars “one 
of the saddest and most tragic spectacles to be seen in Europe since the end of the war 
… Since the flight of the Israelites, in history there has never been such an uprooting 
of intellectual life of a people.”37  By 1923, Russian émigré scholars had established 
themselves in cities across Europe. They were especially numerous in Paris, Prague, 
Berlin and Belgrade and the French, Czechoslovak and German governments all 
provided funds to ensure their wellbeing. 38  The support of the Czechoslovak 
government for exiled Russian scholars was explicitly anti-Bolshevik in its 
motivations.39 In Paris, an émigré intellectual group was set up to maintain links with 
other exiled scholars as well as to begin resuming their traditional university functions 
while in exile. A significant number of exiled Russian scholars initially settled in Berlin 
                                                 
35 Martyn Housden, “White Russians Crossing the Black Sea: Fridtjof Nansen, Constantinople and the 
First Modern Repatriation of Refugees Displaced by Civil Conflict, 1922-23”, The Slavonic and East 
European Review 88/3 (2010), 495-524; Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 
140-8. 
36 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca, NY., 
1992), 37-51; Stuart Finkel, On the Ideological Front: The Russian Intelligentsia and the Making of the 
Soviet Public Sphere (New Haven, 2006), 13-38. 
37 Gonzague de Reynold, La vie intellectuelle dans les divers pays: Russie. Rapport sur la situation et 
l’organisation des intellectuels Russes hors de Russie (Geneva, c1923), 5, in Gilbert Murray Papers, 
Bodleian Library Oxford, MS Murray 352. 
38 De Reynold, La vie intellectuelle., 7; “Les intellectuels russes à l’étranger ”, le Figaro, 12 September 
1923, 4. See Marc Raeff, Russia Abroad: a Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-1939 
(Oxford, 1990), 61-67. 
39 Raeff, Russia Abroad, 61. 
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with the aid of a $10,000 donation from the American Joint Distribution Committee, 
which was administered by the League’s High Commission for Refugees.40 Following 
the hyperinflation of 1923, Russian exiles in Berlin moved elsewhere, often to Paris or 
Prague.41  
Beyond the focus on feeding individuals involved in intellectual work, aid later 
came to focus on the practice of intellectual work itself; it shifted from nutritional 
sustenance to scholarly sustenance. This forms a second major axis to intellectual relief; 
it aimed to support and maintain the practitioners of intellectual pursuits, recognising 
that this required the provision of specialist literature and equipment. A British 
Committee for Aiding Men of Letters and Science in Russia was formed in 1921 
following a report written by H.G. Wells, who had visited Russia in the previous year 
and reported on the perilous state of intellectual life there.42 The committee compiled a 
list of books needed by workers in Russia and appealed to British scientific workers to 
send them to Russia via the committee, to save the “flower of mental life.”43 Aside from 
its work providing food, medicine and clothes for those in need, the ARA also 
distributed 25,000 textbooks, foreign scientific books and journals to the “depleted 
libraries of the higher schools.” 44  In Boston, a group called “Friends of Russian 
Scientists” was established in 1922 under the organization of the scholar of Russian 
literature, H.W.L. Dana. It encouraged people to send aid packages through the ARA 
to distressed academics in Petrograd. Speaking of this initiative, Herbert Hoover said 
that “there is no question of the need of the Russian intellectuals – they as a class have 
                                                 
40 Report by Fridtjof Nansen, High Commissioner for Refugees, LNA C-103-1924, 10 March 1924, 6. 
41 Robert C. Williams, Culture in Exile: Russian Emigrés in Germany, 1881-1941 (Ithaca, NY., 1972), 
111, 130-131. 
42 The Athenaeum, 27 October 1920, 574. 
43 The Athenaeum, 7 January 1921, 25. 
44 UNESCO Archives, Paris, Intellectual Cooperation Papers, C.I.3. 
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suffered more than any other class in the Russian debacle.” 45 Another committee, 
calling itself the “American Committee to Aid Russian Scientists with Scientific 
Literature” reported that up to November 1922 nine tons of scientific literature had been 
sent to Russia, with 40 universities, 23 learned societies, and 120 private individuals 
participating.46 In 1922, the National Research Council in America sent duplicates of 
scientific texts published since 1914 to Russia using ARA distribution networks. By its 
reckoning, no American scientific publications had reached Russia since January 1915 
and, by 1922, Russian scientists were unable to afford them.47  
By 1922, when the League of Nations’ Committee on Intellectual Cooperation 
was established, two clear thrusts had emerged to intellectual relief. First was the 
provision of food and medicine to intellectuals which was differentiated from other 
forms of relief. Second was the sending of relevant academic literature to needy 
individuals and institutions in countries that had been cut off from the international 
community of scholarship during the war and who, in the post-war years, faced 
economic hardships that meant they could not purchase these materials themselves. All 
of this occurred in response to the humanitarian crisis that gripped central and Eastern 
Europe following the war, and was exacerbated by the Bolshevik Revolution and the 
exile of intellectuals across Europe. 
 
The Meanings of Intellectual Relief 
One might still question why, in the midst of a great humanitarian crisis, intellectuals 
and intellectual life were singled out as a distinct focus for aid. In certain cases, the 
need for intellectual relief was particularly resonant owing to the intellectual reputation 
                                                 
45 “Relief for Russian Men”, Science 56/1449 (1922), 389. 
46 “Aid to Russian Scientists”, Science 56/1453 (1922), 504-5. 
47 “Notes on Relief Operations”, A.R.A. Bulletin, 2/21 (1922), 35. 
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and history of certain sites, such as Vienna. In a report written for the League of Nations 
in 1922, Gonzague de Reynold made the case for aid to Austrian intellectuals by 
arguing that, before the war, Vienna could “undoubtedly be considered one of the four 
or five great centres of European civilization.” 48  An appeal by the Universities’ 
Committee of the Imperial War Relief Fund on behalf of university lecturers in Austria 
made a similar argument, claiming that “men who are famous throughout the civilized 
world … are finding very great difficulty in carrying on their work.”49  
While certain sites evidently benefited from well-established reputations as 
centres of learning, a number of more general trends may be seen to underpin 
intellectual relief. First, relief was anti-Bolshevik, and part of the wider process of 
political stabilization that followed the war.50 The victor nations of the war were fearful 
that the new states in central and eastern Europe – such as Germany, Austria, Hungary, 
or Poland – could be overrun by Bolshevism, and this fear briefly became manifest 
following Bela Kun’s short-lived takeover in Hungary in March 1919, while the Paris 
Peace Conference was on-going.51 At the peace conference, the British Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George identified the new enemy as Bolshevism rather than Germany, 
and stories of Bolshevik atrocities – some real, others not – quickly began to make their 
way to western Europe.52 At the peace conference, the American Secretary of State, 
Robert Lansing, linked aid with staving off Bolshevism, remarking that “full stomachs 
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mean no Bolsheviks.” 53  President Wilson said something similar, arguing that 
Bolshevism “cannot be stopped by force, but it can be stopped by food.”54 In this way, 
intellectual relief was part of the wider anti-Bolshevik humanitarian effort that followed 
the war. 
Bolshevism was, in this period, often presented as a threat to western 
civilization, and in this way it could be seen as an extension of the wider discourses 
about the crisis of civilization that followed the war. Writing in 1926, the historian 
Arnold J. Toynbee saw the problem in exactly these terms, arguing that “the struggle 
in Russia since 1917 has been waged not so much between the two Western forces of 
Capital and Labour as between Russia herself and Western civilization.”55 Certainly, 
many justifications for providing intellectual relief, as will be demonstrated below, use 
the language of “civilization” versus “barbarism”, which had been in common use 
during the war to justify the allied effort against Germany and was now transferred to 
Bolshevism as a new post-war enemy.56  Seeing intellectual relief as an anti-Bolshevik, 
reactive phenomenon, helps to explain attempts to feed and house Russian intellectuals 
who had been forced to leave Russia following the revolution, but it does not 
satisfactorily differentiate intellectual aid from more general humanitarian aid in the 
period, nor does it wholly explain the widespread phenomenon of intellectual relief 
beyond Russia.  
 Intellectual relief was primarily - with the notable exception of Russia - aimed 
at the new states that were set up following the end of the war. These states were all 
democracies, established to be (notionally) in keeping with the Wilsonian rhetoric of 
self-determination. Wilson’s ideas underpinned American entry into the war and were 
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adopted by the allies in the final stages of the war, ultimately conditioning the post-war 
order following the collapse of the German, Russian, Habsburg and Ottoman 
Empires.57 In the “successor” states to the Habsburg Empire, sovereignty was assigned 
to the people based on national, ethnic and racial characteristics. This was a messy 
process, especially in central, eastern, and southeastern Europe, which was the meeting 
point of the former Russian, German, Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. The creation of 
post-war democracies was complicated by the juxtaposition of two irreconcilable ideas: 
the rights of the individual and the rights of the group (self-determination).58 This 
created the rather contradictory situation where supporters of democracy were could 
also be strong advocates of population transfers to ensure ethnic homogeneity within 
national populations.59 When Lord Bryce published his two-volume work on Modern 
Democracies in 1921, he claimed that democracy had by then been accepted as “the 
normal and natural form of government”, but noted that the term itself had lost a clear, 
uncontested meaning, having become “encrusted with all sorts of associations.”60 
But what role did intellectual life have to play in the establishment and 
maintenance of post-war democracies? Some writers claimed that intellectual life was 
an important component of a functioning democracy. The postwar president of the 
successor state of Czechoslovakia, Thomas Masaryk, made the connection between 
democracy, public opinion, and intellect in his 1925 memoir about the war period 
(published in English in 1927).61 In the aftermath of the war, Masaryk and other Czech 
leaders pursued a policy of cultural diplomacy that emphasized the ‘western-ness’ of 
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the new Czechoslovak state. Most pertinently, this narrative claimed that the Czech 
people were traditional lovers of democracy (who had been oppressed under the 
Habsburg empire) and that Czechoslovakia was a true democracy, especially as 
neighbouring states became more and more authoritarian. As part of this cultural 
diplomacy, Masaryk developed an image of himself as the “nation’s educator”.62  
In his war memoir, Masaryk argued that the intelligentsia played an important 
role in democracies, especially “the publicists in their ranks”. He noted that their 
members had frequently made a stand against “absolutism and theocracy.”63 Education, 
especially national education, was important in new states which had formerly come 
under the control of a “foreign” government, as was the case with former Habsburg 
territories (Masaryk argued that Czechoslovakia needed to “de-Austrianize” itself).64 
In 1921, Bryce maintained that there was an important place for education in modern 
democracies; “in times when class strife is threatened there is a special need for thinkers 
and speakers able to rise above class interests and class prejudices.”65 Education, in 
particular that found at universities, was essential to this process. However, while Bryce 
claimed that “the education of the citizens is indispensable to a democratic 
government”, it needed to be mixed with practical experience of the democratic 
process.66 In a general sense, education and intellectual life were portrayed as important 
in creating good citizens in a democracy. 
 There was also a more specific way in which intellectual life could bolster 
democracy. Masaryk argued that democracies and new states needed educated experts 
                                                 
62 Andrea Orzoff, The Battle for the Castle: the Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948 
(Oxford, 2009), 57-58, at 58. 
63 Thomas Masaryk, The Making of a State: Memories and Observations 1914-1918 (London, 1927), 
398-399. 
64 Masaryk, The Making of a State, 397. 
65 Bryce, Modern Democracies, vol 1, 87. 
66 Bryce, Modern Democracies, vol 1, 88-89. 
 18 
to assist in the work of government and administration. They would not dominate 
government, but should be mixed with experienced politicians boasting a “practical 
capacity for dealing with parties, parliament and the government.”67  An unnamed 
director of the ARA put this bluntly in a piece published in the A.R.A. Bulletin in 
November 1920. Referring to the deprivation being experienced by intellectuals and 
universities in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary, the article argued that 
“upon the brains of this intellectual class depends the future of these countries … 
Sooner or later these new nations must appeal to their intellectuals for aid in the 
restoration of industry, education, and public affairs.” Moreover, it claimed (like Bryce) 
that these intellectuals were politically conservative or, at the least, neutral: “In the 
denominated countries, the intellectual class is neither radical at the left nor reactionary 
at the right, but represents the sanest viewpoint and capacity remaining in these 
countries, and therefore invaluable for the solution of their present and future 
problems.”68 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace contributed $50,000 to 
the American Central Committee for Russian Relief (whose head was the former 
president of Harvard University, Charles W. Eliot)  “for the relief of refugees from 
Russia and the Near East”. This was recognised as a necessity because the “future 
reconstruction of a Russian republic” would depend upon the contributions of 
“teachers, professional men and educated business people”, all of whom had been 
labelled as “bourgeois” by the Bolsheviks. 69  While the terms “intellectual”, 
“intelligentsia”, and “intellectual class” were frequently used (often interchangeably), 
the figures being referred to usually encompassed university academics (as distinct 
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from students) and was sometimes expanded to include professionals such as doctors, 
lawyers, engineers, architects, artists and musicians, and clergymen.70 
 Intellectual relief was, on occasion, justified as a means of achieving 
reconciliation with the former enemy, although this was still controversial. Many 
international agencies were reluctant to deal with former enemy states, with Germany 
coming in for particular opprobrium as the state seen to have both started the war and 
committed its worst excesses. Moreover, German intellectuals had written strident 
defences of the conduct of the German army in 1914, and many scholars in allied 
countries (especially France) were loath to simply return to normal once the war ended 
in 1918. This meant that German scholars were excluded from many international 
scholarly organisations – mirroring Germany’s exclusion from the League of Nations 
– in the immediate post-war years. However, other ex-enemy states, such as Austria, 
were less tainted by wartime narratives about the origins of the war and atrocities 
committed during it and thus they did not suffer from the same stigma.  
The Anglo-American University Library for Central Europe (AAULCE) was 
established in 1920 to provide English language material for academics in central 
Europe who, owing to rising exchange rates and costs of living, could no longer afford 
academic material published since 1914, meaning that “intellectual workers are 
deprived of indispensible tools.” The founders of the AAULCE saw it as an opportunity 
for “reconciling the intellectual world.” Unlike the League’s Committee on Intellectual 
Cooperation or the American Relief Administration, the AAULCE was explicitly 
concerned with post-war reconciliation between former enemies. “The reconciliation 
amongst the peoples can only come through the cultivation of mind and spirit, and it is 
clear that the great teachers of the world, by the free interchange of ideas, must be the 
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leaders in such an endeavour.” In the spring of 1920, Prof. Everett Skillings toured 
eleven university cities in central Europe, talking to academics and students, and 
helping to establish eight libraries for the AAULCE at Berlin, Budapest, Frankfurt, 
Göttingen, Krakow, Munich, Prague and Vienna. From these libraries, needy 
individuals or institutions could borrow the relevant material or have it sent to them. 
However, it was not only the case that these university cities sought academic literature; 
they also wanted to re-establish international connections which had existed prior to the 
war and had been severed because of it. 71 
 
The League of Nations and the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation 
There has been resurgence of interest in the League of Nations in recent years meaning 
that the League’s intellectual work, neglected for a long time, has attracted much more 
attention.72 Historians have noted the importance of the League’s intellectual work as 
a precursor to UNESCO, or have used it as a means of analysing other themes such as 
global order more generally or the careers of notable individuals who were involved in 
it.73 Problematically, the League never clearly defined “intellectual cooperation” and 
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this was complicated by the term’s resonances in different languages. Speaking in 1930, 
the Oxford classicist Gilbert Murray noted that the term “intellectual cooperation” 
sounded “absurd” in English but was “all right in French or Italian.”74 In the same year, 
the American historian Waldo G. Leland observed that “international intellectual co-
operation is a cumbersome term of fifteen syllables that has become popular since the 
World War, although it describes activities and processes that have existed from the 
most remote times.” 75  By this estimation, intellectual cooperation was not new, 
however, what was new in the 1920s was its frequent invocation as part of the broader 
process of preserving peace and the permanent structures created by the League through 
which this could be managed.76 
In the years immediately following the end of the war, with intellectual life in 
crisis in many European states, a number of proposals were put to the League of Nations 
urging it to create a body dealing with intellectual work. The Belgian internationalists 
Henri la Fontaine and Paul Otlet of the Union of International Associations successfully 
lobbied the League to fund some of their activities after the war and lobbied for the 
creation of a permanent body to deal with intellectual work. 77  Similar proposals 
emanated from France, with Julien Luchaire, the inspector of public education in France 
and an expert in Italian literature, arguing for the establishment of a body to both 
promote international scientific progress and to ensure that national education was 
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geared towards the promotion of peace. Another proposal, emphasising international 
reconciliation through mutual understanding, was received from Austria. 78  In 
September 1921 the League’s Council approved a memorandum by Sir Eric 
Drummond, its Secretary-General, which argued that the League could not succeed in 
any of its aims without paying special attention to issues of education and intellectual 
work.79  
The Committee on Intellectual Cooperation was formally established by the 
League’s Council in January 1922. The body was intended to be a small organisation 
of twelve members which would deal with matters relating to intellectual life, education 
and science and to which the League’s Council could refer specific issues.80 Both its 
origins and initial structure bore the imprint of competing national desires. The French 
historian and politician Gabriel Hanotaux had initially suggested that membership of 
the CIC be restricted to those from victor or neutral countries in the recent war, with 
seats on the committee being reserved for specific countries who would then nominate 
representatives. However, following pressure from the League’s Secretariat, it was 
decided that selection should ultimately rest with the League’s Council, and could 
include representatives of non-member states.81 Hanotaux later wrote that members of 
the CIC were “appointed in consideration of their personal ability and their reputation 
in learned circles, and without any discrimination as to nationality.”82 In other words, 
membership was based on (an undefined) cultural authority, allowing the CIC an 
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opportunity to be a tool of cultural reconciliation, as members from former enemy states 
could be appointed.  
Twelve individuals were appointed to the committee in May 1922; many of 
them had international reputations and they straddled a range of disciplines from the 
humanities to the sciences. Membership was primarily drawn from European states and 
the committee boasted eminent names such as the French philosopher Henri Bergson, 
the British classicist Gilbert Murray, the Polish/French physicist, Marie Curie, and the 
German physicist Albert Einstein. Representatives from beyond Europe included A. de 
Castro (Brazil), D.N. Bannerjea (India), and the astronomer George Ellery Hale (United 
States).83 The CIC was far from a harmonious body; national rivalries and suspicions 
clouded its interactions. Bergson, who was the committee’s chair, had been virulently 
anti-German during the First World War, whereas it was claimed that Bannerjee felt 
isolated as he was the only non-French speaker and as India had historically been 
“treated unfairly by the British.”84  
Hale’s inclusion was important as the US was not a member of the League and 
this opened the way to greater international cooperation. This was also true of the 
selection of Albert Einstein. The inclusion of a member from an ex-enemy state, 
Germany, was made easier by the fact that Einstein had been a prominent pacifist 
during the First World War and was a physicist whose fame was truly international.85 
Einstein’s inclusion suggested that the CIC was desirous of promoting reconciliation 
with former enemy states. However, this would prove problematic, as will be 
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demonstrated below. The report of the CIC’s first meeting in August 1922 – which 
neither Einstein nor Hale could attend – dealt with pre-agreed areas for attention, such 
as bibliography and scientific and university co-operation. It also noted with some 
caution the potential for its work to sprawl beyond the capability of the committee to 
deal with it, especially as the committee only met once a year for five days in Geneva.86  
 Despite the desire to rein in its scope, two new issues had emerged as a priority 
by the time of the CIC’s first meeting in August 1922, and these took prominence in 
the official report: a “general enquiry into the conditions of intellectual life” and 
“assistance to nations whose intellectual life is in danger.” The report noted the threat 
posed to civilization and warned that many universities were in danger of closing their 
doors. It concluded with the ominous warning that “rarely does any great civilization 
die out suddenly; it more often disappears gradually through the progressive and more 
or less rapid extinction of its centres of learning. This was the case with the ancient 
civilization of the Roman Empire; and it may also be the case with our own civilization 
if we take no heed.”87 
 
“Abandoned, isolated, and starved” – The League and Intellectual Relief 
From the moment of its establishment, the CIC had great moral authority. Soon after 
its first meeting in August 1922, it began receiving requests for assistance from 
individuals, governments, and non-state agencies, such as European Student Relief.88 
In response to the latter, the CIC attempted to secure textbooks and laboratory 
equipment and, working with the ESR’s distribution network, had them sent to 
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Russia.89 The CIC also supplied money to the ESR to buy books requested by Russian 
universities.90 A wide range of materials was required, from laboratory equipment to 
periodicals to books, (usually those published after 1914) demonstrating the 
cataclysmic impact of the war on the movement of ideas.91  
 At its second session in August 1922, the CIC identified Austria and Poland as 
being in desperate need of intellectual assistance. It asked two of its members, 
Gonzague de Reynold and Marie Curie to report back on the state of intellectual life in 
each country. De Reynold’s report was submitted to the League’s Council in September 
1922. It noted the historic importance of Austria as an intellectual centre; that inflation 
meant that the Austrian government was unable to subsidise universities as it had before 
the war; that some university libraries had been unable to buy books from abroad since 
1917 and that writers could neither afford to publish nor sell their books. He warned 
that “intellectual life is threatened with extinction through being abandoned, isolated 
and starved.”92 De Reynold argued that the League could play an important role in 
Austria, synchronizing the work of other agencies without great expense. Saving the 
intellectual life of Austria was “the sure basis, because [it is] a moral basis, of her 
economic reconstruction.” 93  De Reynold recommended that the CIC issue an 
international appeal to universities, learned societies and libraries, drawing their 
attention to the situation in Austria and urging institutions to send publications to them.  
 Marie Curie’s report on the condition of Polish intellectual life painted a slightly 
different picture: intellectual life had been suppressed by various governing powers 
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over the preceding two centuries and, in the aftermath of the war, the immediate 
economic crisis was also taking its toll. Curie noted that the situation in Poland was not 
as severe as that in Austria, but argued that Austria was traditionally better resourced, 
having had a vibrant and internationalised intellectual life before 1914, which was not 
the case in Poland. However, Curie argued that “in the case of Poland there is no 
necessity for financial assistance or intervention as in the case of Austria.” Instead, she 
recommended that a commission of enquiry be appointed to undertake a more detailed 
study of conditions there.94 
In November 1922, the CIC acted on de Reynold’s report and published an 
international appeal for the intellectual aid of Austria.95 Using emotive language, it 
opened with the assertion that “no greater danger can threaten a civilization than the 
successive destruction of its homes of learning.”96 It urged universities and learned 
societies around the world to send publications to their Austrian counterparts, to arrange 
professorial and student exchanges with Austria, to send food to Austria, and to enable 
Austrian scholars to take holidays abroad.97 In total, the CIC sent out 903 copies of the 
appeal to learned societies, academies, and universities across the world, from Europe 
to North and South America, Asia and Australia. The appeal was disseminated in either 
French or English, with 416 copies being distributed to institutions (primarily those in 
Britain, North America or the British Empire) in English and the remainder (487) in 
French.98 Privately, the League’s Secretary-General, Eric Drummond, cautioned that 
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“we must be careful about committing ourself [sic] to helping intellectual work in one 
particular country.”99 
The appeal for the intellectual relief of Austria mirrored the economic and 
financial intervention undertaken by the League in the same period. Economic relief 
and intellectual relief went hand-in-hand. The League had a close relationship with the 
successor states who were the living embodiment of the post-war settlement and of the 
idea of self-determination. By 1922, Austria was in the midst of an economic crisis 
which led to a financial intervention by the League’s Economic and Financial 
Organisation (EFO). The EFO coordinated the raising of an international loan as the 
League had no stabilization funds of its own; however, in the words of Patricia Clavin, 
“its ability to marshal evidence and to disseminate it to the wider network of 
governmental and financial institutions was central to the rescue.” 100  The CIC’s 
intervention of 1922 can be seen in similar terms; it did not have the financial resources 
to organize a widespread relief effort in Austria but it did have both a moral authority 
and a well-developed global communications network enabling the dissemination of its 
message, which enabled it to effectively publicise the necessity for Austria’s 
intellectual relief. Books received would be communicated to relief agencies to be, in 
turn, sent to Austria, or they would be sent directly to designated local Austrian 
institutions.101  
Inazo Nitobe, under-secretary general with responsibility for the CIC, received 
letters from around the world from universities and learned societies detailing the books 
that were available for exchange. These were then communicated to Alfred Dopsch, the 
CIC’s correspondent in Vienna, before an exchange of books was effected between the 
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institutions concerned.102 The CIC also forwarded some requests for books to other 
international agencies, such as the Universities Library for Central Europe, the Institute 
of International Education, and the European Centre for the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. Ultimately, the CIC hoped that national committees of intellectual 
cooperation – answering to the international committee in Geneva – would take care of 
this work in the future. 103  Other forms of assistance were also received: Kyushu 
Imperial University in Japan sent cash “in aid of our Austrian colleagues.”104 The CIC’s 
project was possible because of the moral authority of the League and also because of 
the international reputations of the individual members of the CIC, such as Murray, 
Curie, and Bergson. They were uniquely positioned to appeal to an educated 
international audience. 
 The wide publicity given to the League’s project for intellectual relief meant 
petitions soon arrived at the CIC from other countries experiencing intellectual 
deprivation, such as Hungary. Following the publication of the League’s commitment 
to intellectual relief in September 1922, which coincided with Hungarian entry into the 
League of Nations, Hungarian institutions began to contact the CIC, presenting lists of 
books and equipment that they required. 105  In the Hungarian case, appealing for 
intellectual relief was a means of highlighting the severity of the terms imposed on 
them under the Treaty of Trianon of 1920 which shrunk Hungary to one third of its pre-
war size, made it pay significant reparations for war damage, and resulted in three 
million ethnic Hungarians finding themselves living in new states.106 Following the 
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ratification of Trianon, revisionism became Hungary’s “civic religion.” Cultural 
diplomacy was an important means through which Hungary sought to make its case for 
treaty revision and it emphasised Hungary’s cultural superiority in Eastern Europe (as 
well as the western origins of their culture).107 In this way, appealing to the CIC fit a 
broader revisionist agenda for Hungary. 
One consequence of the redistribution of lands of the former Habsburg Empire 
was that a number of universities and libraries came under the control of 
Czechoslovakia and Romania. Hungarian critics of the Treaty of Trianon claimed that 
it had resulted in Hungary losing 745 public and scientific libraries, or four million 
volumes (of a pre-war total of 9.5 million).108 Notably, Kolozsvár University and its 
Hungarian professors had been driven into exile and been forced to re-found their 
university in Szeged in 1921. 109  In 1922, a committee was founded, under the 
presidency of Count Albert Apponyi, to “ensure the scientific work of the Hungarian 
universities”. Apponyi had been responsible for a 1907 law that ensured the dominance 
of the Hungarian language in Hungarian education. 110  The committee argued that 
Hungarian culture was “our sole weapon and source of strength [and] the only 
safeguard of our future.” The committee raised funds domestically for the purchase of 
books and scientific equipment and issued appeals internationally to the League as well 
as to the Rockefeller Foundation and the German Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen 
Wissenschaft. 111  Hungarian appeals for aid leveraged international interest in 
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intellectual relief and the precedent of the League’s appeal on behalf of Austria, but 
made it clear that Hungary’s plight was a consequence of the post-war settlement. 
By 1923, a League-sponsored report, written by the Polish historian Oskar 
Halecki, noted the impoverished state of intellectual life in Hungary. He claimed that 
Hungary was facing “a disaster as complete as that which followed her defeat on 
Mohács field”, a reference to the defeat of the Hungarians at the hands of the Ottoman 
Empire in 1526.112 In September 1924, following another letter by Apponyi to the CIC, 
the League’s Council approved the publication of an appeal on behalf of Hungary 
which was similar to the Austrian document issued almost two years previously. 
However, this appeal was different in two fundamental respects. First, it was written in 
more sober language than the Austrian document; gone were the apocalyptic references 
to the death of civilization. Instead it noted that Hungary was “nearly ruined by the 
war” but was improving due to the League of Nations sponsored loan, finally agreed 
after a contentious period of negotiation between Hungary, its neighbours and their 
allies in the League in March 1924.113 Rather than trying to act as an intermediary as it 
had with Austria, the CIC asked “universities, academies and learned societies of the 
whole world to send their publications to the Hungarian universities, academies and 
learned societies, and to organize exchanges with them.” The appeal asked that all 
donations be sent directly to the Hungarian legation in their respective countries.114 
However, the CIC still received many letters from universities around the world, 
offering to send books to Hungary.115 
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By 1925, the immediate crisis in Europe was passing. The economies in central 
Europe were stabilizing owing (in part) to the financial interventions of the League and 
the existential threat to intellectual life had passed. Apponyi’s Hungarian committee 
felt that the international response meant Hungary had “passed the stage of relief.”116 
Moral and economic intervention demonstrated the potential for ambitious programmes 
in the future, as well as for the CIC to be a forum for national grievances. The Romanian 
delegation to the League claimed that the “the reconstruction of Austria and Hungary 
through the collective efforts of all the other countries is one of the finest pages in the 
history of the League of Nations.” It wondered whether the methods adopted in the 
economic reconstruction of Europe might be applied to the intellectual reconstruction 
of countries “which urgently need it”, through the provision of an international loan for 
intellectual purposes.117 While the proposal was approved by the League’s Assembly, 
it did not meet a favourable response at the EFO.118 
The CIC’s interventions on behalf of Austria, Hungary, and Japan – an appeal 
was also issued on behalf of the Tokyo Imperial University whose library (and its 
740,000 volumes), were destroyed following an earthquake in September 1923 –  were 
all made to support League member states. 119  In each case, it was difficult to quantify 
their success as the CIC facilitated exchanges rather than executing them; moreover, 
they did not keep cumulative records of the outcome of these appeals for intellectual 
relief.  The CIC was more concerned with developing mechanisms to ensure a 
decentralized and smooth exchange of publications between states in central and 
eastern Europe should the need arise in the future. Crucial in this process was the 
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foundation of national committees of intellectual cooperation.120 The League had a 
particular interest in ensuring that the successor states of central and eastern Europe 
would be sustainable, as these were the living embodiment of the doctrine of self-
determination. Intellectual vitality was simultaneously an economic and cultural 
problem, and economic stabilization allowed for the nations to begin purchasing 
academic literature from abroad once more. However, the question of intellectual 
intervention was more problematic when it came to non-member states such as 
Germany. 
 
The limits of intellectual relief: Germany 
Germany was, like Austria and Hungary, a vanquished state in the recently ended war, 
but it held a different place in the victors’ imagination. Not only was Germany seen as 
the primary aggressor in the events leading to the outbreak of war in 1914 (with this 
being given legal status in Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles), German scholars 
and intellectuals had issued truculent defences of their nation’s behaviour, specifically 
denying that it had committed atrocities in Belgium. This meant that at the cessation of 
the war, Germany was frozen out of the League of Nations and many other international 
bodies. In the natural sciences, a “boycott” of German science would not be lifted until 
after Germany’s admission to the League in 1926. 121  Germany’s place in the 
international order was, in Daniel Laqua’s words, “a key challenge for intellectual 
cooperation.”122 
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At the height of the crisis in Austria, Germany was suffering from similar, if not 
worse, problems arising from spiralling inflation. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 
December 1922, Karl Kautsky reported that German “artists and writers” were “literally 
starving. And they are starving not only physically; they are finding it more and more 
impossible to satisfy their intellectual hunger, to purchase books, instruments an other 
scientific means of support.”123 German academics began to organize themselves to 
ensure that national scientific life remained as strong as possible in the circumstances. 
In 1920 the Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft was founded with the support 
of all German universities, academies, technical schools and scientific institutes, to give 
financial assistance to struggling libraries and to coordinate university research.124 
From 1922, with the onset of hyperinflation, the Notgemeinschaft also began drawing 
the attention of international audiences to the critical situation in German universities. 
This raising of awareness of the plight of German universities and intellectuals was 
broadly successful and assistance was received from a number of international bodies, 
such as the ESR and the Universities’ Committee of the Imperial War Relief Fund, 
which began to undermine the international intellectual isolation of Germany by former 
belligerents.125 However, the League of Nations was an exception to this. 
The CIC had a contradictory attitude towards non-member states. On the one 
hand, it viewed its work as a means to involve countries such as the United States, in 
the work of the League. Albert Einstein was appointed to the first CIC committee as an 
“acceptable” German as his wartime pacifism saved him from the opprobrium which 
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other German scholars received in allied countries. However, in March 1923, as the 
Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr entered its third month, Einstein wrote to the 
committee to resign his position, citing the League’s reluctance to aid Germany.126 The 
CIC’s attitude towards Germany also upset members like Gilbert Murray. In March 
1924 he wrote a strident letter to The Times criticizing the committee and in a letter to 
Sir Eric Drummond, he described Germany’s non-inclusion in the CIC’s appeal for 
intellectual aid as “an absolute disgrace to the League” and “a scandal.”127  
Across the academic world, the French and Belgians are usually seen to have 
perpetuated the exclusion of Germany with the greatest vigour. This partly explains the 
attitude of the CIC which was chaired by the French philosopher Henri Bergson, who 
was known for his rhetorical belligerence towards Germany during the war. Bergson 
wrote privately in 1924 that “in current circumstances, this complete cooperation [with 
Germany] is not possible.”128 However, this hostility was reciprocated on the German 
side. Friedrich Schmidt-Ott, the president of the Notgemeinschaft, viewed the work of 
the CIC with profound misgivings, not only because of a general suspicion of the 
League of Nations as constituting a league of victor states, but also as Schmidt-Ott 
claimed to remember the hostile rhetoric, during and immediately after the war, of two 
CIC members, Bergson and George Ellery Hale. This made the Notgemeinschaft 
reluctant to deal with the CIC. The League’s Secretary-General, Drummond, claimed 
that Gonzague de Reynold had made a number of approaches to the Notgemeinschaft 
to solicit their help in setting up a national committee on intellectual cooperation, with 
each attempt coming to nothing. 129  De Reynold also sought their assistance in 
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composing a report on the nature of intellectual life in Germany and in this he 
eventually had some success.130 De Reynold wrote that “it is obvious that intellectual 
cooperation in Germany does not depend upon the Intellectual Cooperation committee 
alone.”131 However, the CIC’s reluctance to make an appeal on behalf of Germany, as 
it had with Austria and Hungary, went against its claims (best expressed in the Austrian 
appeal) to be motivated by safeguarding civilization, especially as German scholars 
presented Germany’s plight as a matter of world importance, given Germany’s pre-war 
eminence as a nation that excelled in academic research.132 In this context, the CIC 
reflected, rather than changed, the international order, and demonstrated the persistence 
of national animosities born of the war. 
 
The Institutionalisation of Intellectual Relief 
The CIC’s meeting of August 1922 had argued that intellectual life needed saving in 
certain instances and that a general enquiry into the state of intellectual life was required 
across Europe and the world to identify other countries where civilization was 
threatened. The appeal issued in favour of Austria had underlined the need for a wider 
enquiry. It elicited responses from many countries who claimed that their intellectual 
life was also imperilled. In Bucharest, the Academia Romana highlighted the privations 
suffered by Romania in the war where libraries were left disorganized, laboratories had 
been pillaged during wartime occupation, and the post-war slump meant that the 
Romanian government could not afford to address the needs of academic institutions.133 
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It called for an immediate enquiry to analyse intellectual life from the Black to the 
Aegean seas.  
 The Austrian appeal also revealed the extent of intellectual relief being led by 
other agencies and the risk of duplicating relief activities. In June 1923, Maxwell 
Garnett of the League of Nations Union in Britain wrote to the CIC, criticizing them 
for being one body in a crowded field rather than taking a coordinating role. 134 
Following the CIC’s appeal on behalf of Austria, the Universities’ Committee of the 
Imperial War Relief Fund wrote of their disappointment to learn that such an appeal 
had been issued without their knowledge as they had been undertaking the same type 
of work for two years. 135 A similar letter was received from the Anglo-American 
Universities Library for Central Europe, who worked with the Universities 
Committee.136  
 By the end of 1922, the CIC began to expand its activities based on both of these 
issues. First, it recognized that central and eastern Europe were particularly badly 
impacted by intellectual deprivation and sought to set up a permanent scheme of mutual 
assistance involving the donation or exchange of books and other materials. This 
scheme would be effected through the national committees on intellectual cooperation, 
which all member states were encouraged to form to gather information, identify 
national intellectual needs, and then communicate them either to other national 
committees or the CIC.137 In this way, it was hoped that future intellectual relief would 
be structured and formalised rather than the result of ad hoc action. 
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  In December 1922, the CIC drew up a questionnaire about the nature and 
organization of intellectual life to be circulated to national governments across the 
world. The hope was that this would provide an insight into the nature of intellectual 
life and identify countries in need of immediate assistance.138 The questionnaire was 
primarily concerned with state control of education, the types of institutions present in 
each country, and the extent of international cooperation. In this way it assumed that 
intellectual life was primarily embodied by institutions under direct state oversight, 
which was not the case in countries like Britain. At the same time, the CIC also 
employed scholars to publish reports on intellectual life in different countries, based on 
these reports. Published between 1923 and 1924 in a series called Enquiry into the 
Conditions of Intellectual Work in Various Countries.139 These reports were primarily 
focused on higher education and the sciences, and presented detailed tables detailing 
the number of students in higher education, the number of universities and scientific 
institutions in a given country, while also presenting a historical narrative summarising 
the intellectual development of each country.  They included League members and non-
members – such as the United States and Germany – alike.140  
 Cumulatively these initiatives sought to take stock of intellectual life following 
the war and to formalise the mechanisms of intellectual relief. The preoccupation with 
higher education and the organisation of scientific research tells much about how the 
CIC understood intellectual life and its scope. By 1925, with the stabilization of 
economies in central Europe and the signing of the Locarno treaties which paved the 
way for German entry into the League, the immediate crisis was seen to have passed 
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and the enquiries ended quietly. However, the published accounts left a permanent 
record of the state of intellectual life in Europe and beyond which could be a practical 
aid to facilitating future intervention by the League and other international 
organisations. 
The mechanisms of intellectual relief were further solidified in the summer of 
1924 when the French government made an offer to the CIC to establish and fund an 
International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) in Paris. The offer was 
formally accepted by the Council of the League of Nations in December 1924.141 The 
first director of the IIIC was the aforementioned French writer, Julien Luchaire,142 One 
of the IIIC’s roles was to work with national committees on intellectual cooperation to 
enable clear communication between nations and the League, especially in instances 
where assistance was required. By 1924, eighteen countries had established national 
committees. Of these, only one, Brazil, was outside Europe, and many were successor 
states.143 By 1937, this number had grown to thirty-eight nations, of whom fourteen 
were situated beyond Europe.144 The establishment of the Institute, in tandem with the 
national committees on intellectual cooperation, constituted a greater 
institutionalization of mechanisms to provide intellectual relief in the future, both by 
identifying crises of intellectual displacement and intellectual starvation and creating 
structures to effect an efficient response. In this way, the League’s early work on 
intellectual relief structured the emergence of permanent institutions that emerged 
thereafter. This is of particular note when considering that the IIIC would later be 
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reborn as UNESCO after the Second World War. The establishment of the IIIC also 
posed difficult questions about the influence of individual nations, such as France, 
which both hosted and provided the bulk of the funding for the new body. It 
demonstrated that intellectual cooperation would continue to be leveraged by individual 
states for the promotion of their national prestige.145  
 
Conclusion 
The Locarno treaties of 1925 paved the way for Germany to enter the League of Nations 
in 1926 and ushered in a period of reconciliation, international cooperation, and 
optimism. However, in what Zara Steiner calls “the Hinge Years”, the League was 
fatally undermined by the onset of the Great Depression, the Manchuria Crisis, and the 
failure of the Disarmament Conference. 146  By 1933, Hitler had taken power and 
Germany had withdrawn from the League of Nations. Beginning in the same year, he 
began his assault on intellectual freedoms and a new wave of intellectual exile began, 
with Jewish (and other) scholars from Nazi controlled territories seeking refuge in 
Britain, North America, and elsewhere.147 The story of intellectual exile in the 1930s – 
and the great transnational relief organizations – are much better known than the 
fledgling attempts of the early 1920s. The events of the 1930s are, however, part of the 
same transformation that was born of the First World War, namely, the preoccupation 
with the international relief of organised intellectual life.  
Post First World War intellectual relief was a response to the upheavals of war 
which led to famine, epidemics, economic chaos and the mass displacement of people. 
International relief of intellectuals emerged in the war and became a distinct and 
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significant arm of international humanitarianism in its aftermath, organised and 
justified in a different manner to other humanitarian interventions. Intellectual relief 
was justified by aid-givers as a means of safeguarding centuries-old cultures and, by 
association, upholding democracy in successor states against the threat of Bolshevism. 
For the recipients, appealing to international organisations such as the CIC could be a 
means of articulating national grievances about the post-war settlement to international 
audiences, as in the Hungarian case. For the League of Nations, intellectual relief was 
an essential precursor to its mission to inculcate intellectual cooperation between 
member states with a view to easing national antipathies following the war. The 
organisation of intellectual relief also demonstrated the speed with which the CIC 
acquired a moral authority, enabling it to draw appeals and requests from around the 
world, even when it did not have the funds to make good on them.  
After the optimism of the nineteenth century, with international and global 
connections made possible by, telegraph, steam-propelled travel, the 
professionalization of disciplines, the growth in the number of universities, and the 
formation of a huge number of national and international journals and associations, 
twentieth century intellectual life was threatened by war and its many consequences. 
Intellectuals in exile, de Reynold wrote, carried the flame of learning with them when 
it was threatened at home; it was the duty of the civilized world to “help them to 
maintain that flame.”148 His words would prove prescient just over a decade later.  
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